Everything logical should be able to be stated in understandable and because of that memorable terms. That's not to say the world can be described understandably per se -- the world is not fundamentally logical. But if someone says "you just have to see it, or it just is", rather than "it follows from this principle working like this", it seems likely that they're more confused than you are. (I have already been proven wrong on these, but it's to a degree -- I assume I will discover the intuitive understanding.) There are, I suppose, important foundational principles which just have to be assumed.
How about morality -- is that one of these foundational principles? I think not. But it is clear that there is physical truth -- a fixed sort of truth -- and spiritual truth. And spiritual truth includes not only your wildest imaginations (and then some) but also things outside of your wildest imagination. But then how do we factor in the effect of data, then? All truth is constructed from some limited data of the real world. Its degree of truth, then, is a function of how close it comes to the real world. There is a truth for both physical science and human morality -- or does it? I'm not sure if we can describe what we should define as truly good -- but we can describe what we will define as truly good.
The test of a real philosopher: to learn without being taught?
If the harder disciplines (physics, mathematics) are half as screwed up as philosophy, economics, and medicine (in no particular order), then God help us.
I've forgotten everything else I wanted to say.
Sunday, May 18, 2008
Thursday, May 08, 2008
Affirming the Consequent, Denying the Antecedent
Both of these are misnomers. When you "affirm the consequent", you are actually affirming the antecedent upon observing the consequent.
If P, then Q.
Q.
Then P.
This is the fallacy that they call affirming the consequent. The fact that its misnamed makes it more difficult to remember.
Similarly, denying the antecedent:
If P, then Q.
Not P.
Then not Q.
Another fallacy, but again, it is misnamed. The denial of the antecedent is observational. The fallacy lies in denying the consequent based on the observation of not P.
If P, then Q.
Q.
Then P.
This is the fallacy that they call affirming the consequent. The fact that its misnamed makes it more difficult to remember.
Similarly, denying the antecedent:
If P, then Q.
Not P.
Then not Q.
Another fallacy, but again, it is misnamed. The denial of the antecedent is observational. The fallacy lies in denying the consequent based on the observation of not P.
Wednesday, May 07, 2008
Intuition Pumps (Thought Experiments), Free Will, and Nietzsche
In light of the way that modern philosophy works, this post by Adam Rawlings deserves to be spread far and wide. It's not often that you find philosophers rejecting (even to a degree) rather than analytically debating (fallacious) thought experiments (there are good thought experiments -- check out out I made previously by hitting the thought experiments tag).
I haven't studied modal logic, but it seems that what is "logically possible" is rather arbitrary. Logically possible in our physical world is likely not what philosophers think it is; some of these "logically possible" assertions strike me as similar to Descartes' claim that "the more perfect -- that is to say, that which contains in itself more reality -- cannot be a consequence of and dependent upon the less perfect. This truth is not only clear and evident..." (Third Meditation). ADHR criticizes all of the thought experiments on this basis.
There's another criticism for Frankfurt thought experiments. As a compatibilist, Harry Frankfurt accepts determinism. Yet if determinism implies that there is a single future path which rules out metaphysical responsibility, as Dennett, Pereboom, Honderich, Inwagen, Kane, and others believe, then Frankfurt has to explain how the "free will" necessary for moral (metaphysical) responsibility exists. His thought experiments assume "free will" because people make a free choice. He attacks what he calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, focusing this attack on actions -- but what really matters is choices. In Frankfurt's imaginary world, people can still make "free" choices for which they are ultimately responsible. (Technically, the agent in Frankfurt's experiment is only responsible for his action when the controller did not have to act.) What I'm saying is that Frankfurt's thought experiments don't get him any closer to the moral responsibility he wants; he still hasn't addressed the regular problems with "free will" moral responsibility. He won't be able to, either, because the metaphysical free will which allows ultimate metaphysical responsibility is incoherent. We are not responsible for our positions, and thus we are not ultimately responsible for our actions. We are only responsible in the sense that we have to be responsible (responsibility keeps people's behaviors in check). This critique is obvious, but somehow it hasn't gained traction in the philosophical literature; I imagine most philosophers would reject it out of hand simply because they don't want to admit that they've studied Frankfurt counterexamples these past 30+ years without noticing.
If we can get past this focus on ultimate responsibility, however, we can start to think about taking control of our lives and acting with at least some personal responsibility -- you aren't responsible for the position you're in, but goddamnit, you're gonna have to make the best of it. At the same time, this position recognizes (as we do legally) mitigating and aggravating factors in actions, and advocates that we study the causal factors behind behavior to maximize our ability to exert rational control over our bodies. Dennett struggles with this idea in Freedom Evolves, but this is Nietzsche's entire goal, actually, although he pushes people to do it without science (while recognizing that ultimately it may come only through science):
Nietzsche makes the distinction between the causa sui -- the self-creating "free will" which we continually debate, and the self's "will to power", the causa prima which we really need to focus on. We can't be create ourselves, but ideally we can act with our rational self rather than our animal instincts, and avoid being jerked around by 'stimuli'.
UPDATE: Thinking more about the Frankfurt example -- in the linguistic sense, yes, Frankfurt's agent is responsible when he chooses to act as the controller wants him to act despite the fact that he cannot do otherwise. But this is a counterexample, and an outlandish one at that. It's really restricted to just this case -- when the agent acts differently than the controller wanted and must be controlled, the agent is no longer responsible. How is it supposed to apply in the real world?
I haven't studied modal logic, but it seems that what is "logically possible" is rather arbitrary. Logically possible in our physical world is likely not what philosophers think it is; some of these "logically possible" assertions strike me as similar to Descartes' claim that "the more perfect -- that is to say, that which contains in itself more reality -- cannot be a consequence of and dependent upon the less perfect. This truth is not only clear and evident..." (Third Meditation). ADHR criticizes all of the thought experiments on this basis.
There's another criticism for Frankfurt thought experiments. As a compatibilist, Harry Frankfurt accepts determinism. Yet if determinism implies that there is a single future path which rules out metaphysical responsibility, as Dennett, Pereboom, Honderich, Inwagen, Kane, and others believe, then Frankfurt has to explain how the "free will" necessary for moral (metaphysical) responsibility exists. His thought experiments assume "free will" because people make a free choice. He attacks what he calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, focusing this attack on actions -- but what really matters is choices. In Frankfurt's imaginary world, people can still make "free" choices for which they are ultimately responsible. (Technically, the agent in Frankfurt's experiment is only responsible for his action when the controller did not have to act.) What I'm saying is that Frankfurt's thought experiments don't get him any closer to the moral responsibility he wants; he still hasn't addressed the regular problems with "free will" moral responsibility. He won't be able to, either, because the metaphysical free will which allows ultimate metaphysical responsibility is incoherent. We are not responsible for our positions, and thus we are not ultimately responsible for our actions. We are only responsible in the sense that we have to be responsible (responsibility keeps people's behaviors in check). This critique is obvious, but somehow it hasn't gained traction in the philosophical literature; I imagine most philosophers would reject it out of hand simply because they don't want to admit that they've studied Frankfurt counterexamples these past 30+ years without noticing.
If we can get past this focus on ultimate responsibility, however, we can start to think about taking control of our lives and acting with at least some personal responsibility -- you aren't responsible for the position you're in, but goddamnit, you're gonna have to make the best of it. At the same time, this position recognizes (as we do legally) mitigating and aggravating factors in actions, and advocates that we study the causal factors behind behavior to maximize our ability to exert rational control over our bodies. Dennett struggles with this idea in Freedom Evolves, but this is Nietzsche's entire goal, actually, although he pushes people to do it without science (while recognizing that ultimately it may come only through science):
"learning to see -- habituating the eye to repose, to patience, to letting things come to it; learning to defer judgement (italics mine), to investigate and comprehend the individual case in all its aspects. This is the first preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to react immediately to a stimulus, but to have the restraining, stock-staking instincts in one's control. Learning to see, as I understand it, is almost what is called unphilosophical language 'strong will-power'. (Twilight of Idols, What the Germans Lack Section 6.)
Nietzsche makes the distinction between the causa sui -- the self-creating "free will" which we continually debate, and the self's "will to power", the causa prima which we really need to focus on. We can't be create ourselves, but ideally we can act with our rational self rather than our animal instincts, and avoid being jerked around by 'stimuli'.
UPDATE: Thinking more about the Frankfurt example -- in the linguistic sense, yes, Frankfurt's agent is responsible when he chooses to act as the controller wants him to act despite the fact that he cannot do otherwise. But this is a counterexample, and an outlandish one at that. It's really restricted to just this case -- when the agent acts differently than the controller wanted and must be controlled, the agent is no longer responsible. How is it supposed to apply in the real world?
Tuesday, May 06, 2008
Econometrics: Worse Than Useless?
Econometric Modeling as Junk Science.
The other one is in the May issue of The Pluralist Economics Review. Unfortunately not updated at the moment.
I really need start studying something really useful, like computer science.
The other one is in the May issue of The Pluralist Economics Review. Unfortunately not updated at the moment.
I really need start studying something really useful, like computer science.
Some feedback for the FBI

Since the FBI's Contact Us page doesn't allow you to email them, here's what my feedback states. Not that they'll listen to it.

First off, you can stop using these terrible feedback forms. There should be hardly any boxes, and more textual input. There's basically two things that people need to refer to: content and design. That's it.
Your main page seems somewhat overloaded.
Your Most Wanted terrorists page goes to a stange place where I can't go back -- it should be incorporated into your other page.
You shouldn't use tables for design. Update to more CSS.
Your History page should include links to laws that have affected you.
It's shameful that you have no email address on your website. I wanted to send this to you personally.
Usually I'm more harsh in my criticism, but again, it's not gonna matter anyway. The feedback goes into the void.
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Decent Review of the Skeptical Environmental
I've been looking for a nice, concise little review of the notorious book for a while. It's by Frank Ackerman; type hit ctrl-f and then type "Tree-Huggers" and you'll find it.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
The damage of cell phone radiation
Recently the press has been all over this article; a doctor's interpretation of current research into cell phones and conclusion that they are harmful. This claim has been made by experts previously; similarly, a scientific study found that cell phone masts [pdf] did seem to increase cancer rates.
Now there's a study that has found a direct relationship between cellphone radiation and tissue changes. I found out about it through Mercola, but the science comes from BioMedCentral, the premier open-access biology journal. While I still use my mobile phone, I'll likely be using a landline more when I settle down for a reasonably long time. The cost of using a landline for most of my calls is not that high.
Now there's a study that has found a direct relationship between cellphone radiation and tissue changes. I found out about it through Mercola, but the science comes from BioMedCentral, the premier open-access biology journal. While I still use my mobile phone, I'll likely be using a landline more when I settle down for a reasonably long time. The cost of using a landline for most of my calls is not that high.
Monday, April 07, 2008
Hume Didn't Discover the Problem of Induction
I noticed that Hume's insight into the problem of induction was not so original as philosophers like to claim when I took Ancient Philosophy. Good to see that the philosophical literature has raised the point as well. The same applies to just about all philosophical literature, I imagine -- which makes me wonder whether philosophy has been just a distraction from real knowledge all along. The Greeks set not only the foundation -- they may have built a good sturdy building, as well, and instead of letting it lie and giving it its due recognition, we tear it out down out of a need to publish. Adding more words to a world which is already drowning in them seems like a problem to me.
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Listen To a Ph.D Economist Confuse The Discount and Fed Funds Rate
Somewhat shocking, but typical of an academic: listen to Russ Roberts interview Tyler Cowen.
Some other interesting comments: How much of the current credit crunch is due to lack of transparency? And why have mortgage-backed securities stopped trading, rather than trading at a value with the expected number of defaults worked in? These two seemed to assume that mortgage-backed securities aren't trading at that expected value!
Roberts: "I'm not so sure how much of this trouble is due to a lack of transparency. It seems unlikely..."
Wow.
Some other interesting comments: How much of the current credit crunch is due to lack of transparency? And why have mortgage-backed securities stopped trading, rather than trading at a value with the expected number of defaults worked in? These two seemed to assume that mortgage-backed securities aren't trading at that expected value!
Roberts: "I'm not so sure how much of this trouble is due to a lack of transparency. It seems unlikely..."
Wow.
Friday, March 21, 2008
Quantifying justice
While I've often said that morality is a function of individual preferences and cultural influences (which it is), there are certainly some things associated with ethics which are fairly objective. One of these is justice. Justice is just about universally considered to be "right". Justice can be quantifying: when a being receives a reward (penalty) proportional to the benefits (harms) they've created, the result is just. In our society, many people are not handled justly, and that's something to be concerned about.
Thursday, March 20, 2008
Economics Might Be Changing
My previous post reflects a perspective based on a set of information. My information set is rather limited. While economists would like to gloss over the information limitations because they are mathematically annoying, these information problems are the greatest problems which people face when making economic decisions.
Economics is changing. Some of the George Mason economics, at least, are skeptical of the claims that your average mainstream economist will try to make. This probably reflects a growing awareness among the all economists that, say, applying the Coase theorem willy-nilly doesn't really make any sense. While I don't respect the politics of the GMU economists or the way that these political biases manifest themselves in their work, I will admit that they're probably on a better track than many of the prestigious mainstream economists, and some of their offhand blog posts are probably much more insightful and informative than many of the journal articles written today.
Check out "Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as the New Mainstream" by Hodgson, which I found on the Pluralist Economics Review. So far it's an excellent journal. The article is well-worth reading.
Mainstream economics:
As I continually try to point out, the real world is a world of "reasonably bright individuals [maybe that's a little far] in information-poor environments" [with a surplus of distracting noise] rather than "infinitely bright agents in information rich environments" (Hodgson 2007:11).
Economics is changing. Some of the George Mason economics, at least, are skeptical of the claims that your average mainstream economist will try to make. This probably reflects a growing awareness among the all economists that, say, applying the Coase theorem willy-nilly doesn't really make any sense. While I don't respect the politics of the GMU economists or the way that these political biases manifest themselves in their work, I will admit that they're probably on a better track than many of the prestigious mainstream economists, and some of their offhand blog posts are probably much more insightful and informative than many of the journal articles written today.
Check out "Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as the New Mainstream" by Hodgson, which I found on the Pluralist Economics Review. So far it's an excellent journal. The article is well-worth reading.
Mainstream economics:
- Assumes a can-opener. This is not just a cliched joke.
- Looks at the individuals as homogenous rational agents rather instutionally-influenced.
- Has "a preoccupation with technique over substance" (p.18, Blaug).
- Basically ignores the other social sciences.
- Must change in order to make progress.
As I continually try to point out, the real world is a world of "reasonably bright individuals [maybe that's a little far] in information-poor environments" [with a surplus of distracting noise] rather than "infinitely bright agents in information rich environments" (Hodgson 2007:11).
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Do corporations oppose free trade?
Apparently Dr. Don Bourdreaux of Cafe Hayek noticed my comment that he, along with his colleagues, seems like a "shill for industry". His reply is that, if he was a shill for industry, he would fit a large number of conditions. The fallacy here seems to be that all shills for industry must fit all, or least some of these conditions -- it's a form of straw man argument, or perhaps a red herring. If all shills had to fit all those conditions, the word would be useless.
What does shill actually mean? Merriam-Webster defines shill as "a: one who acts as a decoy (as for a pitchman or gambler) b: one who makes a sales pitch or serves as a promoter". Wiktionary defines shill as "a person paid to endorse a product favourably, while pretending to be impartial".
Does Bourdreaux "serve as a promoter" of industry? Certainly. Do I think he's been paid egregiously to do it, as some other scholars of the Cato Institute have? Not really. Can he still be a shill? As I elaborated in my comments, shill may not be the exact word. Rather, they are apologists for the status quo. They don't think there's something wrong with the way we are treating our environment, and believe that the free market (composed of industry) will fix all problems if only it was completely unshackled.
The GMU economists seem to ignore the significant incentives that corporations have to look for short-term profit rather than the long-term, ,and the worrying concentration of power in a few firms, who exert that power both in the market and in politics. Similarly, they don't seem to mind the increasing concentration of wealth. They've expressed doubts on global warming, an area which they are not experts in. Scientists are as certain on global warming as economists are on free trade (which means that it depends on who you talk to) (do any believe in global warming? I'd like to know). They seem bothered that people ignore economists when it comes to free trade, but don't recognize the irony in their global warming skepticism. Further, and most damning in my mind, they never seem to say a peep about the information asymmetries which dominate economic decisions.
Does your typical corporation oppose free trade? Doubtful. If industry didn't benefit from free trade, it's unlikely that it would happen. Economists don't have that much power. Efficient multinational corporations benefit enormously from free trade -- it's the inefficient corporations which oppose free trade, such as the old steel industry (which is quickly being supplanted by mini-mills). Especially in today's globalized world, businesses benefit from free trade -- they can hire cheap labor and export to new emerging markets. It's likely that most businesses realize that it's the 21st century, and there's no going back from globalization (or at least, that's how it appears). Tariffs mean paying more for inputs and closed foreign markets. A glance at The Economist's CEO Briefing 2007 shows that CEOs are (or at least were) extremely bullshit about the global economy and trade, and, while worried about international competition, your average business is not really exerting a lot of political pressure to stop it. This Fortune 500 survey of 1987 found that a third of CEOs declared, without prompting, that they were free traders, and that CEOs want government to promote free trade -- and by that, they mean bipartisan free trade. I wonder what the number would be now.
Ironically, I like quite a few of the posts at Cafe Hayek -- for example, this one (though I think we can get some idea on the effect of NAFTA). But attributing most of our problems to regulation is just ridiculous. Yes, there is far too much government going on, but most of that government is spurred by industry -- the military-industrial complex which elected George W. Bush will continue to funnel most of our tax dollars to corporations. The recent financial crisis is not caused by government. Can we blame the government for our environmental crisis?
What has government done right in the past hundred years? Hmm: Internet, national road network, Clean Air Act, and the SEC., to name a few I'd agree that the government has done quite a few things wrong, but these were more a function of bad leaders than some intrinsic nature of government. It's not so simple as "industry good, government bad".
What does shill actually mean? Merriam-Webster defines shill as "a: one who acts as a decoy (as for a pitchman or gambler) b: one who makes a sales pitch or serves as a promoter". Wiktionary defines shill as "a person paid to endorse a product favourably, while pretending to be impartial".
Does Bourdreaux "serve as a promoter" of industry? Certainly. Do I think he's been paid egregiously to do it, as some other scholars of the Cato Institute have? Not really. Can he still be a shill? As I elaborated in my comments, shill may not be the exact word. Rather, they are apologists for the status quo. They don't think there's something wrong with the way we are treating our environment, and believe that the free market (composed of industry) will fix all problems if only it was completely unshackled.
The GMU economists seem to ignore the significant incentives that corporations have to look for short-term profit rather than the long-term, ,and the worrying concentration of power in a few firms, who exert that power both in the market and in politics. Similarly, they don't seem to mind the increasing concentration of wealth. They've expressed doubts on global warming, an area which they are not experts in. Scientists are as certain on global warming as economists are on free trade (which means that it depends on who you talk to) (do any believe in global warming? I'd like to know). They seem bothered that people ignore economists when it comes to free trade, but don't recognize the irony in their global warming skepticism. Further, and most damning in my mind, they never seem to say a peep about the information asymmetries which dominate economic decisions.
Does your typical corporation oppose free trade? Doubtful. If industry didn't benefit from free trade, it's unlikely that it would happen. Economists don't have that much power. Efficient multinational corporations benefit enormously from free trade -- it's the inefficient corporations which oppose free trade, such as the old steel industry (which is quickly being supplanted by mini-mills). Especially in today's globalized world, businesses benefit from free trade -- they can hire cheap labor and export to new emerging markets. It's likely that most businesses realize that it's the 21st century, and there's no going back from globalization (or at least, that's how it appears). Tariffs mean paying more for inputs and closed foreign markets. A glance at The Economist's CEO Briefing 2007 shows that CEOs are (or at least were) extremely bullshit about the global economy and trade, and, while worried about international competition, your average business is not really exerting a lot of political pressure to stop it. This Fortune 500 survey of 1987 found that a third of CEOs declared, without prompting, that they were free traders, and that CEOs want government to promote free trade -- and by that, they mean bipartisan free trade. I wonder what the number would be now.
Ironically, I like quite a few of the posts at Cafe Hayek -- for example, this one (though I think we can get some idea on the effect of NAFTA). But attributing most of our problems to regulation is just ridiculous. Yes, there is far too much government going on, but most of that government is spurred by industry -- the military-industrial complex which elected George W. Bush will continue to funnel most of our tax dollars to corporations. The recent financial crisis is not caused by government. Can we blame the government for our environmental crisis?
What has government done right in the past hundred years? Hmm: Internet, national road network, Clean Air Act, and the SEC., to name a few I'd agree that the government has done quite a few things wrong, but these were more a function of bad leaders than some intrinsic nature of government. It's not so simple as "industry good, government bad".
National Databases to Increase Government Efficiency
- The Consumer Product Safety Commission database of products. The Senate just passed a bill requiring this, but the House doesn't like the idea. Similarly, other relevant information on each product should be added to this database.
- A database on corporations. Contractor Misconduct is sort of a good start to this, but not quite. These databases should have all relevant information on a corporation, and should, of course, be linked to the CPSC's database, along with the usaspending.gov contractor database. To reduce overhaul, companies should be required to input this information themselves, after registering on the website. If the corporation is lax on updating its page, it should be fined.
- A national database of all local police stations, recording all complaints on officer behavior and their official resolution. If you read Reddit or Digg, you've likely heard about ratemycop.com. The trouble is that none of these comments are official; they have to be taken with a major grain of salt. And, if you browse through it, you'll find that there's a lot of stupid shit on there already.
- All complaints to federal agencies, including complaints on the federal agency's effectiveness, should be made public. All complaints which an agency collects as part of its duty need to be made public along with their resolution. There needs to be an appeal process. Note this story on on a study the GAO on the FCC's handling of complaints on business practices.
- Obama recently revealed his earmarks. All Congress members need a profile connected to a database, and all earmarks need to be made public. This shouldn't be a choice.
- A federal database on hospitals: misconduct of doctors, any possible performance ratings, a place to register to complaints. All prices for all procedures should be made public. Again, these profiles would be updated by the individual hospital rather than government bureaucrats.
- Every government website should make all the complaints regarding its website functionality public as well. Thus, problems on the website (which I frequently find, but are rarely addressed) will be resolved quickly and efficiently if the agency wants to retain face. Comments should be votable by registered users.
- A government account for all US citizens, detailing all information the government has collected on you. Access to this data would require a search warrant, and if any agency requested your information, you should be immediately notified. Libertarians will hate me for this, but I believe that the government should allow citizens to verify their identities cleanly and easily. Ultimately this will allow people to surf their web with their identities, comments, and so on verified if they so chooose.
- All complaints/comments on government policy should be "votable" by those with verified identities a la Reddit/Digg. Thus, the complaints which gather the most interest will go to the top. Of course, all these things could also be sorted differently (by date, by most votes, by most viewed, by resolved, ect.) Plus, all complaints could be also be rated 1-5 stars by any web surfer. You could see what people with verified identities thought was the most important vrs. your average web surfer.
In fact, there's many more databases that could and should be compiled and made public, esp. in reference to government projects and their costs. These could be linked to each other to expose fishy connections and trends. Citizens could then see for themselves what business and government is doing.
While things like Wikipedia have made a good stride in linking together relevant information and greatly decreasing information asymmetries, Wikipedia can't link to information which is not publicly available. Plenty of the most juicy, important information for citizens is still hidden by the government.
As I've said often before, the first and most important function of government is to act as a bridge for information.
Friday, March 14, 2008
Obama, Transparency, Earmarks
I have mixed feelings about Obama. While I loved him when I heard that he passed the Transparency Act of 2006, I was disappointed to find later that they'd basically taken usaspending.org and tossed a .gov at the end of it. They spruced it up a bit and made it more user-friendly, but I'm not sure that there was as much value-added as there could be. There was plenty of glory, however.
Yesterday Obama revealed his earmarks. I'm not real government-savvy (I've been exploring the government websites for about a year now, but they're still a maze to me), and I wonder why he even had to reveal them. Aren't they publicly-available? Apparently not -- or apparently it would be a major hassle to compile the data, as it's probably in text files. So it's $740 million, including a fishy $1 million for his wife's hospital. I'll give him credit for revealing it. Clinton has not revealed hers. I don't think he's completely pure, but he certainly has a better record for integrity than McCain (who was involved in the Keating case) or Clinton, who is just plain slimy.
I'd trust Obama and McCain more than Clinton when it comes to making smart economic policy, as well. While Obama has made a fuss about NAFTA, his book comes down more in favor of free trade:
EDIT: Where is the press release of these revealed earmarks from Obama? The fact that it was revealed last Thursday (March 13), but there is no press release from Obama's website is disturbing, to say the least. It suggests that he's trying to downplay his earmark requests. However, the earmarks question is fairly prominently displayed (#2) in his AnswerCenter.
Yesterday Obama revealed his earmarks. I'm not real government-savvy (I've been exploring the government websites for about a year now, but they're still a maze to me), and I wonder why he even had to reveal them. Aren't they publicly-available? Apparently not -- or apparently it would be a major hassle to compile the data, as it's probably in text files. So it's $740 million, including a fishy $1 million for his wife's hospital. I'll give him credit for revealing it. Clinton has not revealed hers. I don't think he's completely pure, but he certainly has a better record for integrity than McCain (who was involved in the Keating case) or Clinton, who is just plain slimy.
I'd trust Obama and McCain more than Clinton when it comes to making smart economic policy, as well. While Obama has made a fuss about NAFTA, his book comes down more in favor of free trade:
A tariff on imported steel may give temporary relief to U.S. steel producers, but it will make every U.S. manufacturer who uses steel in its products less competitive on the world market.... U.S. Border Patrol agents can't interdict the services of a call center in India, or stop an electrical engineer in Prague from sending his work via email to a company in Dubuque. When it comes to trade, there are few borders left.
EDIT: Where is the press release of these revealed earmarks from Obama? The fact that it was revealed last Thursday (March 13), but there is no press release from Obama's website is disturbing, to say the least. It suggests that he's trying to downplay his earmark requests. However, the earmarks question is fairly prominently displayed (#2) in his AnswerCenter.
Saturday, March 08, 2008
Complaints on Kant's Categorical Imperative
When I was a freshman, someone once tried to explain the difference between a consequentialist and deontological morality by claiming that the former was concerned only with the results of actions (an action with good consequences is moral) while the latter was concerned with the action itself -- the instructor may have even said the intention, although that is so clearly false that I'm probably purposefully remembering wrong. Yet consequences have everything to do with both of them. Consequentialist is an artificial, modern term which has been imposed on broad groups of historical philosophies. (According to Wikipedia, Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the word -- no citation.) It is misleading.
Both Kant's categorical imperactive and utilitarianism, to use the two most common (or only?) examples of "deontological" and "consequentialist" philosophies, are concerned with one's intentions. Without good intentions, one cannot be moral. The difference lies in the action, and, in particular, the consequences of the action. However, for Kant the abstract, universal consequences are the most important, while for someone like Mill the real (human) consequences take priority. Kant's argument is similar to the slippery slope: if you let one person do it, then everyone is allowed to do it, and then society descends into madness. What he ignores, however, is the laws that prevent everyone from doing it, and that, at least ideally, impose substantial risk upon those who do act immorally.
Kant tries to dress up his moral philosophy in flowery metaphysics: acting in a way that cannot be universalized to all men is logically contradictory, he says. Even if he's right, his categorical imperative is not as strong as he thinks, because an action should be universalized with all relevant factors included. That includes one's position and the circumstances surrounding one's position. Abstraction sheds all irrelevant information, yet in this case nearly all information is relevant. He cites an example of the suicidal man, and then claims that if we let him kill himself, then we would be saying its OK for all of us to kill ourselves, as we all have all suffered misfortune. Yet some of us have suffered far more misfortune than others, and not all of us have suffered enough misfortune to consider killing ourselves. If we allowed the terminally ill to kill themselves, for example (euthanasia), that doesn't lead to no people -- because not all humans will become terminally ill at the same time. Similarly, if all starving men who are able to snatch a bit of bread do snatch that bread, it's not as if there will be no bread left (unless there's a very, very serious famine -- in which case the rich will live and the poor will die). Instead, poor people will generally be barred from grocery stores and arrested fairly often. These examples can be applied in many cases -- even to murder, robbery, drug-dealing, ect. Further, one's position is especially relevant: a ruler of a nation is obviously allowed to do things that the average peasant cannot -- even, arguably, declare war.
Lastly, treating everyone as a end is impossible, but even worse (for Kant), insisting on the categorical imperative as you deal with other people leads to you treating others as a means to an end -- in this case, the end is the categorical imperative, and your friend who you cannot lie to save is simply a means to that end. This contradiction lies on top of the empirical impossibility of the entire idea. All individuals must treat all others as means to ends. Friends are a means to laughter and enjoyment, businessmen are a means to certain business ends, ect. This is no minor problem.
Like most historical philosophy, Kant's imperative is full of holes. But ultimately neither Kant or Mill's conception of the good is truly satisfactory, because the good is a subjective, personal decision. Everyone's conception of what is good will differ to some degree. For a philosopher knowledge may be the highest good; for your average American, pleasure; for an environmentalist, environmental beauty.
Both Kant's categorical imperactive and utilitarianism, to use the two most common (or only?) examples of "deontological" and "consequentialist" philosophies, are concerned with one's intentions. Without good intentions, one cannot be moral. The difference lies in the action, and, in particular, the consequences of the action. However, for Kant the abstract, universal consequences are the most important, while for someone like Mill the real (human) consequences take priority. Kant's argument is similar to the slippery slope: if you let one person do it, then everyone is allowed to do it, and then society descends into madness. What he ignores, however, is the laws that prevent everyone from doing it, and that, at least ideally, impose substantial risk upon those who do act immorally.
Kant tries to dress up his moral philosophy in flowery metaphysics: acting in a way that cannot be universalized to all men is logically contradictory, he says. Even if he's right, his categorical imperative is not as strong as he thinks, because an action should be universalized with all relevant factors included. That includes one's position and the circumstances surrounding one's position. Abstraction sheds all irrelevant information, yet in this case nearly all information is relevant. He cites an example of the suicidal man, and then claims that if we let him kill himself, then we would be saying its OK for all of us to kill ourselves, as we all have all suffered misfortune. Yet some of us have suffered far more misfortune than others, and not all of us have suffered enough misfortune to consider killing ourselves. If we allowed the terminally ill to kill themselves, for example (euthanasia), that doesn't lead to no people -- because not all humans will become terminally ill at the same time. Similarly, if all starving men who are able to snatch a bit of bread do snatch that bread, it's not as if there will be no bread left (unless there's a very, very serious famine -- in which case the rich will live and the poor will die). Instead, poor people will generally be barred from grocery stores and arrested fairly often. These examples can be applied in many cases -- even to murder, robbery, drug-dealing, ect. Further, one's position is especially relevant: a ruler of a nation is obviously allowed to do things that the average peasant cannot -- even, arguably, declare war.
Lastly, treating everyone as a end is impossible, but even worse (for Kant), insisting on the categorical imperative as you deal with other people leads to you treating others as a means to an end -- in this case, the end is the categorical imperative, and your friend who you cannot lie to save is simply a means to that end. This contradiction lies on top of the empirical impossibility of the entire idea. All individuals must treat all others as means to ends. Friends are a means to laughter and enjoyment, businessmen are a means to certain business ends, ect. This is no minor problem.
Like most historical philosophy, Kant's imperative is full of holes. But ultimately neither Kant or Mill's conception of the good is truly satisfactory, because the good is a subjective, personal decision. Everyone's conception of what is good will differ to some degree. For a philosopher knowledge may be the highest good; for your average American, pleasure; for an environmentalist, environmental beauty.
Friday, March 07, 2008
Has Economics Changed?
During a class not too long ago I was asked to state my favorite academic. Because I'd read his work not long before, and CEO pay is so out of control, I mentioned Lucian Bebchuck.
I'm also a major fan of David Colander. Pick any one of his diverse set of articles and you'll likely find something thought-provoking. In some ways, however, he seems to be almost like a sociologist or philosopher studying economics. Right now I'm reading The Changing Face of Mainstream Economics, in which he argues that mainstream economics has changed, and that today it is held together by its "modeling approach to economic problems" (p. 2). He believes that it is undergoing a paradigm shift.
Perhaps that's true. He should certainly know better than myself. But most of the papers that I read reflect the same old economics, and most economists do not seem so interested in difficult-to-quantify concepts such as information asymmetries and externalities. It seems as if most economists would rather run simple regressions or input-output analyses. However, Colander believes that minute "stealth changes" (p. 4) are happening, unbeknownst to the agents of change themselves.
If we were to judge by the internet, then the most influential economists in the world are the George Mason economists of Marginal Revolution, Cafe Hayek, and Econlog. These guys seem to be everywhere. I don't like them much -- they seem to be shills for industry, and just plain lazy. (Consider Kling's offhand comment that dogs impose more of a burden on the environment than SUVs, without any research.) They aren't exactly mainstream, either, but their views are fairly stereotypical.
What am I trying to say? I'm not happy with mainstream economists, but I'm fairly happy with economics theory. Information asymmetries, externalities, marginal analysis -- these are helpful for looking at the world. I'm just disappointed that so few economists seem to use these in the way they should: advocating greater transparency, taxes on pollution, subsidies for external benefits, and things like a national, federally-funded Health Savings Account plan. Further, the defense of things like CEO pay by way of pointing out its correlation with market capitalization strikes me as incredibly naive -- as if there was a dearth of "good chief executives".
But perhaps the blame should not be placed on economists in particular, but rather on humans in general. After all, how could people be so stupid as to think that only people who have previously worked as a CEO are good candidates, and worth hundreds of millions of dollars? And have they learned their lessons now, as these high-flying executives run corporate America into the ground?
Is it so hard to understand why executives who have no long-term stake in their companies might do a poor job? Corporate executives should be paid their bonuses in restricted stock grants -- and restricted for the long-term. By long-term I do not mean a year. I mean five years. In the meantime, let them live on a reasonable salary.
EDIT: Here is my response to Professor Bourdreaux.
I'm also a major fan of David Colander. Pick any one of his diverse set of articles and you'll likely find something thought-provoking. In some ways, however, he seems to be almost like a sociologist or philosopher studying economics. Right now I'm reading The Changing Face of Mainstream Economics, in which he argues that mainstream economics has changed, and that today it is held together by its "modeling approach to economic problems" (p. 2). He believes that it is undergoing a paradigm shift.
Perhaps that's true. He should certainly know better than myself. But most of the papers that I read reflect the same old economics, and most economists do not seem so interested in difficult-to-quantify concepts such as information asymmetries and externalities. It seems as if most economists would rather run simple regressions or input-output analyses. However, Colander believes that minute "stealth changes" (p. 4) are happening, unbeknownst to the agents of change themselves.
If we were to judge by the internet, then the most influential economists in the world are the George Mason economists of Marginal Revolution, Cafe Hayek, and Econlog. These guys seem to be everywhere. I don't like them much -- they seem to be shills for industry, and just plain lazy. (Consider Kling's offhand comment that dogs impose more of a burden on the environment than SUVs, without any research.) They aren't exactly mainstream, either, but their views are fairly stereotypical.
What am I trying to say? I'm not happy with mainstream economists, but I'm fairly happy with economics theory. Information asymmetries, externalities, marginal analysis -- these are helpful for looking at the world. I'm just disappointed that so few economists seem to use these in the way they should: advocating greater transparency, taxes on pollution, subsidies for external benefits, and things like a national, federally-funded Health Savings Account plan. Further, the defense of things like CEO pay by way of pointing out its correlation with market capitalization strikes me as incredibly naive -- as if there was a dearth of "good chief executives".
But perhaps the blame should not be placed on economists in particular, but rather on humans in general. After all, how could people be so stupid as to think that only people who have previously worked as a CEO are good candidates, and worth hundreds of millions of dollars? And have they learned their lessons now, as these high-flying executives run corporate America into the ground?
Is it so hard to understand why executives who have no long-term stake in their companies might do a poor job? Corporate executives should be paid their bonuses in restricted stock grants -- and restricted for the long-term. By long-term I do not mean a year. I mean five years. In the meantime, let them live on a reasonable salary.
EDIT: Here is my response to Professor Bourdreaux.
Tuesday, March 04, 2008
Assorted Interesting News
Does alcohol actually work? Quote:
I get
Dr. Mercola's monthly newsletter. This
was particularly interesting. From the article:
The NYT on China: Choking on Growth. Quote from the wildlife article:
In a series of studies in the 1970s and ’80s, psychologists at the University of Washington put more than 300 students into a study room outfitted like a bar with mirrors, music and a stretch of polished pine. The researchers served alcoholic drinks, most often icy vodka tonics, to some of the students and nonalcoholic ones, usually icy tonic water, to others. The drinks looked and tasted the same, and the students typically drank five in an hour or two.
The studies found that people who thought they were drinking alcohol behaved exactly as aggressively, or as affectionately, or as merrily as they expected to when drunk. “No significant difference between those who got alcohol and those who didn’t,” Alan Marlatt, the senior author, said. “Their behavior was totally determined by their expectations of how they would behave.”
I get
Dr. Mercola's monthly newsletter. This
was particularly interesting. From the article:
Three have died and another four have battled the disease since two masts were erected on the roof of the five-storey block which has become known locally as the Tower of Doom.
The cancer rate on the top floor - where residents of five of the eight flats have been affected and the three who died all lived - is 20 per cent, ten times the national average.
...
World Health Organisation guidelines have dismissed the risks of masts despite other evidence which has found they are harmful.
The NYT on China: Choking on Growth. Quote from the wildlife article:
Nearly 40 percent of all mammal species in China are now endangered, scientists say. For plants, the situation is worse; 70 percent of all nonflowering plant species and 86 percent of flowering species are considered threatened.
Sunday, February 03, 2008
If I Was President...
One of my first laws would be to require all companies to provide any customer with all data linked to their account/name, on demand, for free. Ideally they would make it web-accessible -- the smart ones, at least, would, because sending it out manually would cost more money.
Further, they would have to delete it on demand as long as doing so doesn't conflict with other laws.
Further, they would have to delete it on demand as long as doing so doesn't conflict with other laws.
Friday, February 01, 2008
Long-term tax rates
It's hard for me to see the value added in some of financial innovations and institutions. Credit card companies often simply allow people to indebt themselves more. Insurance companies must have had crazy margins before Geico started this price war. Did this rate swap add value to the situation?
What if we had a tax structure that encouraged real long-term investing? We already have long-term taxes rates for 1+ year of owning a stock; how about additional tax breaks for 5 or 10-year ownership? Or how about higher short-term rates and a more gradual long-term rate?
The short-term craziness of financial markets today is a real distraction from what matters. People don't think for the long-term. That's why we had these dumb loans: the people in charge of these companies were only thinking a few years into the future.
What if we had a tax structure that encouraged real long-term investing? We already have long-term taxes rates for 1+ year of owning a stock; how about additional tax breaks for 5 or 10-year ownership? Or how about higher short-term rates and a more gradual long-term rate?
The short-term craziness of financial markets today is a real distraction from what matters. People don't think for the long-term. That's why we had these dumb loans: the people in charge of these companies were only thinking a few years into the future.
Sunday, December 09, 2007
The Effect of the Drug War
Increasingly, the young murder suspects coming to the station for questioning seem to lack basic morality, said Sgt. Tim Nolan, who has been investigating Oakland homicides for 17 years.
"There are more and more families where there's less and less structure," he said. "Talking to these suspects day in and out, there's a higher percentage today with no sense of right and wrong. It's frightening, but we are creating super-criminals."
- http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/12/09/MNS1RBLQ5.DTL
Morality is woven into the fabric of a society, creating a structure of normative rules. Morality is functional. When society changes, those rules change, within range of certain biological limits...
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