I finished A People's History of Science by Clifford D. Connor a few days ago. I was pleasantly surprised by the book: it captures and appears to validate my cynical, somewhat contemptuous attitude towards extremely abstract philosophy and economics perfectly. There are several theses, drawn from various historians/philosophers of science who seem to have done the major legwork. The most blatant thesis, drawn from Edgar Zilsel is that mechanics, craftsmen, laborers, sailors, and other common people advanced science. In support of this, Connor notes numerous figures and evidence that scientists did not attribute their findings to unsung assistants. I found two other theses particularly intriguing: that the oft-cited "Greek miracle" was anything but, and that the traditional scientific elite sometimes acted contrary to good science and ethics.
Most of us are vaguely aware of the latter, but may be surprised by the former. I know I was surprised: when I entered college as a freshman, I cited Greece as the foundation of Western civilization. My professor suggested Egypt, Babylon, and Phoenicia, but I was skeptical and never got the chance to investigate further. Connor shows that there is a reason for that. My comments below largely relate Connor's story (which are relating other academic stories); I don't have enough background knowledge to affirm or contest his facts.
Another intriguing thought covered briefly is the possible Oriental origin of Western Civilization's science, argued by Joseph Needham. I won't discuss this in more detail; although I find in intriguing, it's likely more controversial than Needham makes it appear. According to Needham, the list of Chinese technologies imported into Europe include printing, gunpowder, magnetic compasses, clockwork, casting of iron, stirrups, Pascal's triangle, rudder, segmental-arch bridges, and much more (p. 165).
The Greek Miracle
The Greeks themselves cited Egypt as the root of their wisdom. Aristotle, Plato, and Herodotus all said mathematics was brought from Egypt (Connor p. 123). Some said Pythagoras brought it, although Connor says that is unlikely; Thales was also reputed to have spent time in Egypt. Connor (p. 126, citing Martin Bernal) says that these statements by the Greeks were downplayed by "Classical Philologists" at the University of Gottingen in the late 1700s. Connor says that the scholars of antiquity apparently tried to explain away the Egyptian and Phoenician influence, including the adoption of the Phoenician alphabet, because Egyptians were a black mongrel race. Connor, citing Martin Bernal, is not exactly clear on how the influence is explained away. Among the scientists who extended this tradition was Georges Cuvier, the secretary of the Parisian Academy of Sciences. The Royal Society and the Academy were the two most prestigious scientific institutions of the day.
Connor argues that the Ionian materialists (Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander) had a pro-science philosophy which was supplanted by the highly abstract, teleological philosophy of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Benjamin Farrington has apparently developed the argument in Science in Antiquity that Plato's influence "was one of the main reasons for the death of science in the Greek world" (p. 146), as thought became increasingly a priori. Connor mentions something which I don't think was ever mentioned in my ancient philosophy class: only Plato's Timmaeus was known to European scholars up to the 1100s. Hippocrates stands out as an exception to the antiempirical Greek tradition. Commenting on Connor's perspective, I do think that the Greeks contributed to science (which was passed on to the Arabs), but I agree with Connor that Socrates and Plato probably had negative to neutral impacts. Aristotle was more of a scientist, but unfortunately he did not seem to emphasize the scientific method, as Francis Bacon later pointed out (leading to the "Baconian method"), although Bacon's thoughts were preceded by The Canon of Medicine and I believe Bacon's philosophy was more reflective of the culture than instructive. Galileo was studying physics in the early 1600s, while Bacon first published the Novum Organon in 1620.
Dirty Secrets of Scientific Elite
Like Howard Zinn, Connor digs up information deeply buried. The last half of the book focuses on how the scientific elite's emphasis on "value-free science" actually supported conservative politics and dubiously moral agendas (eg social darwinism, eugenics). Robert Boyle, the chemist known for Boyle's Law, could afford to hire numerous assistants ("Making Experiments by Others Hands", p. 330 - Tycho Brahe is another great patron, p. 324) and pursue scientific investigations. That and his undeniable scientific brilliance made him a major figure in the Royal Society. He along with others in the Royal Society believed in witchcraft and demonology (see, for example, his book The Devil of Mascon) and presumably did not oppose the ridiculous trials and punishments which went along with it. Connor notes that the burning of witches reached an all-time high in the 1630s (p. 365), coinciding with the rise of the Royal Society. Similarly, the famous proscientist philosopher Francis Bacon brutally tortured at least a few people (p. 363).
Connor frames the scientific landscape of the 1600s as a battle between the entrenched gentry elite (represented by figures such Boyle and Bacon above) and the craftsmen and artisans who do a lot of legwork. Connor chooses Bacon as a representative of the former group and Paracelsus as a representative of the latter (p. 305). Interestingly, neither figures were true scientists. Bacon isn't known for any science; Paracelsus had odd hermetical views on medicine and his theory on the "dose makes the toxin" is just common sense (and misleading common sense at that; some substances have negative effects at practically any dose while most substances are beneficial or neutral up to a hazardous exposure). Nevertheless, Paracelsus campaigned against a rotten Galenic medicine, preached the virtue of working with raw materials and alchemic exploration, which Connor says inspired revolutionary scientific figures such as Paracelsus admirer Johann Rudolph Glauber (p. 371), a notable chemist. The battle can be seen, for example, in the Parisian Royal Academy's rejection of Joseph von Fraunhofer, the inventor of the spectrometer, as a full member (p. 375). The last quarter of the book notes that programmers and "garage entrepeneurs" were the new craftsmen.
Concluding thoughts
The book brings together several amazing scholars in the history and philosophy of science. Reading their Wikipedia articles, it is clear that these people's works were often more controversial than Connor makes them appear. Avoiding the appearance of dishonest bias is one of the most important techniques for a good nonfiction writer. By relying on concrete and well-cited facts for his case, Connor actually manages to avoid seemingly dishonestly biased, even if his bias is clear. Connor doesn't say that the great scientists were not great scientists, but he isn't afraid to point out their flaws whereas most history draws a whitewash.
One New York Times review says that the book misses something when it doesn't describe the personalities of its individuals. I didn't get that impression; I get enough description of individuals, and he certainly doesn't avoid going deep into individuals. Disorganization is the biggest problem; the same people will be covered in different places on only slightly different topics. The NYT review also criticizes the extreme use of quotes. Again, this doesn't bother me - I like to know exactly what the cited source is saying, and if someone with more expertise has said something eloquently before, why not repeat it?
I definitely disagree with Connor on strange pseudosupernatural scientific theories. For example, he doesn't criticize the problems with Paracelsus' medical philosophy, and later he appears to defend Franz Mesmer's animal magnetism movement as a "people's science movement" when it was actually superstitious and possibly fraudulent. It sounds like a precursor to the modern "therapeutic touch":
Mesmerist therapy consistened in channeling the magnetic fluid through the patient ... often though not always the magnetic power was directed into a patient by a laying of hands ... the patient would report ... intense heat ... patients tremebled violently, went into trances... (pp. 404-5
You get the picture. Don't get sucked into thinking that anything is valid science.
As far as another theme, the values embedded in science - raw scientific data is value-free. The processing, interpretation, and application are not value-free. The decision as to what science to pursue is not value-free. Scientists cannot hide behind science for their values (or lack thereof). While it should go without saying, I think it's worth it to say that scientists, even brilliant ones, are not always good people. In many cases they are reactionary and immature.
